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In this paper we describe the existence of financial illusion in public accounting and we 
comment on its effects for the future sustainability of local public services. We relate these 
features to the lack of incentives amongst public managers for improving the financial 
reporting and thus management of public assets. Financial illusion pays off for politicians 
and managers since it allows for larger public expenditure increases and managerial slack, 
these being arguments in their utility functions. This preference is strengthen by the short 
time perspective of politically appointed public managers. Both factors run against public 
accountability.  
This hypothesis is tested for Spain by using an unique sample. We take data from around 
forty Catalan local authorities with population above 20,000 for the financial years 1993-
98. We build this data basis from the Catalan Auditing Office Reports in a way that it can 
be linked to some other local social and economic variables in order to test our 
assumptions. 
 
The results confirm that there is a statistical relationship between the financial illusion 
index (FI as constructed in the paper) and higher current expenditure. This reflects on 
important overruns and increases of the delay in paying suppliers, as well as on a higher 
difficulties to face capital finance. Mechanisms for FI creation have to do among other 
factors, with delays in paying suppliers (and thereafter higher future financial costs per unit 
of service), no adequate provision for bad debts and lack of appropriate capital funding 
either for reposition or for new equipments. For this, it is crucial to monitor the way in 
which capital transfers are accounted in local public sheet balances. As a result, for most of 
the Municipalities we analyse, the funds for guaranteeing continuity and sustainability of 
public services provision are today at risk.    
 
Given managerial incentives at present in public institutions, we conclude that public 
regulation recently enforced for assuring better information systems in local public 
management may not be enough to change the current state of affairs 
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In most of OECD countries over the last decades, conventional accounting information 
systems have been threat by the development of new Information Technologies. Potentials 
for better budget reporting have improved a lot (see P. Heller, 2003). The aim of improving 
public accountability through better information is indeed in the core of the new public 
management (Lopez et. al. 2003). Despite this, implementation depends on the incentives 
of managers and politicians and things are much less clear in this arena. 
 
Under models of bureaucratic behaviour and fiscal illusion (Niskanen, 1971)
1, it is 
plausible to assume that lack of transparency may be there to stay. As it helps to hide 
inefficiency, poor financial reporting may favour managerial slack against public interest.  
 
Despite the fact that the former assumptions may be extended to public administration in 
general, our interest here is to test some particular propositions related to the creation of 
Financial Illusion (FI) at the local public sector level. Mayston et al (1992) have shown that 
this is an appropriate field of analysis given a larger diversity in the existing practices.  
We confront then the effects of FI on local public budgets, and the absence of incentives 
amongst public managers for a better financial information system to improve the 
management of publics assets, on a sample of forty two Catalan municipalities2 along the 
1993-98 period. Data are taken from the  Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya (The 
Catalan Auditing Commission) on actual settled expenditure and revenues.  
 
In the first section of the paper we build the notion of FI from the common theory of fiscal 
illusion. In section 2 we construct a FI index specifically related to the levels of under-
reporting the actual costs of public services. This refers to the delay of payments to 
creditors (on cash-based accountancy criteria), lack of accounting for depreciation costs, 
upgrading the existing equipments and the absence of provision of financial reserves for 
doubtful public credits. All these factors help to create an illusive ‘cash surplus’ that feeds 
public expenditure and managerial slack. In other words, these accounting practices for 
hiding less visible spending needs help to create the financial illusion that additional more 
visible expenditure are still possible. This goes against the sustainability of the public 
services in the long term. But short, and not long term, is the main concern of politicians. In 
this sense, they may easily collude with managers for the purpose of expenditure increases. 
We correlate in section 3 those accounting practices to the level of expenditure overruns, 
debt finance on total revenues, and as a result to some indicators of the sustainability of 
local services. The ‘sustainability’ criterion is approached by the difference between 
estimated capital needs and observed accumulated capital revenues plus the margins to 
raise additional taxes and debt). Finally we conjecture on how this situation favours local 
politicians and public managers and we conclude that in order to rebalance the present 
                                          
1 - A recent survey can be found in Hacienda Pública Española 164- (1/2003) ‘Organizaciones burocráticas e 
ineficiencia X: Una revisión de modelos’ A. Rodríguez y J. Suárez. Pps  83-109. 
2 - In order to homogenise our sample, given the high disparity in size and budgets of Spanish local 
authorities, we have taken data only for those with populations of over 20,000.   3 
situation we need to reinforce rules and provide incentives from an evidence-basis public 
accountability policy point of view. 
 
 
I.  ON FISCAL ILLUSION 
 
The topic of financial illusion and its relevance in public management has been 
traditionally discussed in the context of fiscal illusion and public expenditure growth. For 
this purpose, three broad strategies can be pursued to manipulate the citizen (median voter) 
preferences: First, political actors  and bureaucrats may try to show that the tax-price of 
public sector services appear to be lower than actually is (Miller and Moe, 1983). Second, 
they may find desirable to foster the idea that the median voter is in receipt of larger real 
income increases as a result of tax/ expenditure decisions (Miller, 1977). Third, politicians 
and bureaucrats can attempt to alter the preferences of the voters to raise the absolute value 
of the marginal rate of substitution between public supplied goods and the rest (Cullis and 
Jones, 1998). 
 
In more general terms, Puviani (1903) developed different notions of illusion, being the 
most common that of having individuals to ‘feel good’ about themselves’3. Fiscal illusion is 
then frown on complex revenue structures and on the most visible benefits of expenditure. 
In addition, debt illusion failing individuals to realise that when debt is issued their income 




However, testing for FI has proved to be a rather more difficult task. In this sense, Oates 
(1988) suggests that although several ‘illusions’ are plausible in public management, the 
empirical support for them is not overwhelming. Moreover, given revenue endogeneity, 
competing plausible hypotheses may go alongside some rather ‘ad hoc’ theories.  
 
Our paper tries to contribute to this arena by offering evidence on the reasons for FI in the 
provision of local public services. We relate FI to the absence of sound financial and 
economic information on the part of local politicians and public managers. In this sense FI 
undoubtedly shelters the lack of transparency. We cannot however disentangle whether FI 
is the cause or the effect of misreporting information for public accountability, since no 
causality test can be adopted. In any case, both elements allow for increasing public 
expenditure at the cost of a poor management of the public assets which affects the 
financial sustainability of the services in the future. 
 
 
II.- HYPOTHESIS BUILDING 
 
This paper is grounded on the following evidence: Despite (i) the development of new 
powered Technological Information Systems, (ii) a greater concern on the economic and 
                                          
3 - No need probably to expand this argument. Puviani wrote his Teoria della Illusione Finanziaria  in 1903! 
4 - A good summary on this can be found in  the corresponding Chapter of ‘Public Finance and Public Choice’ 
J. Cullis and P. Jones. Oxford, second edition, 1998.   4 
social consequences of the public intervention in modern societies, and (iii) the acceptance 
in democracy of greater social accountability of public expenditure, incentives to 
implement accurate financial reporting methods on public sector activity seem to be absent 
in the public management field.   
 
Our hypotheses to explain why this happens are built on: 
 
- The absence of incentives for a more accurate financial reporting 
 
1-Public managers in Spain have several reasons for not improving budgetary or 
managerial information given the way in which they are paid (not performance-related) and 
appointed (many of them politically dependent). In this context, any better information 
reporting may create counterproductive rachet effects: the evidence on poor performance 
may be used against managers’ interests, more than in their benefit, and it may cause 
political embarrassment too. Since public managers in Spain are nowadays more political 
than customer orientated, risk aversion behaviour would go against innovation in 
information systems and transparency. 
 
2- At the institutional level, the reasons for politicians not to request better financial 
information are related to:  
i)  the higher risk of losing marginal (discretionary) expenditure, given the 
existing asymmetries and budget rigidities
5;  
ii)  the pitfalls derived from changes in the accountancy practices and then from 
a potential misinterpretation of the data under a more conservative 
accountancy practices. 
 
All this reflects on the lack of identification of the actual unit costs of service provision, 
price variance in input purchases (from different tendering methods and procurement 
policies), output performance variability (from changes in the organisation of the 
production function) and on final outcomes assessments (derived from several forms of 
public control). 
 
3- Lack of accurate information on the financial and economic situation has larger costs at 
the long than at the short term. This last is the most relevant term for political purposes. 
Indeed, poor financial reporting may risk the capacity for maintaining the services 
provision at medium and long term by endangering its sustainability over time, precisely 
when they will need to be adjusted to new circumstances. However, this usually is not the 
main political concern. 
We will approach this lack of responsibility in public expenditure by the level of budget 
overruns and by the ratio of debt to total local revenues 
                                          
5 - To prove that you are ‘a good guy’ and then taking a bit of the marginal resources available proves to be 
more difficult than loosing a bit of actual resources already spent  due to the fact you are identified as a ‘bad 
guy’.   5 
 
 
The financial illusion hypothesis. 
 
FI is based in this paper on the following premises 
(i) From a Public Choice point of view, local politicians look for satisfying the 
greatest amount of citizens’ demands, since this is likely to win voters’ support, and 
avoiding the increase in taxes (or at least the perception of such). Citizens are, in general, 
most concerned with the present rather than on the future effects of policies, as to require 
more information on balanced present expenditure and future revenues. Transparency 
would require to increase awareness on the long term consequences of new budget 
initiatives with regard to the key sources of expenditure  pressure and of the limits on 
increasing the tax burden
6.  
 
(ii) Benefits for managers from FI are: short-term sustainability of public services is 
not under question and marginal expenditure increases are possible. In fact, generally 
speaking, reducing costs in an underhanded way does not negatively affect the results (the 
benefit and losses account), and help the fiction of a (constant) net balance of the existing 
local assets. In addition, FI helps lower local price increases in public services. 
 
The items of the balance sheet accounts that offer a larger potential for under-valuation are 
those related to delaying payments to creditors and an insufficient provision for asset 
reposition and risky debtors. This is due either to the fact that these are expenses that affect 
third-parties, with not much political pressure since they are regular creditors of the 
administration not willing to risk reputation, or because it does not seem to exist clear-cut 
criteria for interpreting the treatment of capital assets  in public accounting systems. 
Moreover in none of these cases external auditing has been made up to day compulsory: 
auditing is random, and expected sanctions for having followed unsound practices are low. 
 
We will approach precisely the FI derived from the lack of a correct depreciation of assets 
and from the absence of reserves for risky debtors by calculating the difference between the 
official recorded expenses and those which would result under ‘sound’ accounting 




-The consequences of FI for an efficient public management 
 
The relationship between management accounting and strategic behaviour of the 
organisations has been largely analysed in the literature (E. Caplan, 1971; R. Cooper and R 
Kaplan, 1988; Chenhall R and D Morris , 1986). 
                                          
6 - An excellent revision on this issue can be found in Peter Heller Who will pay International Monetary Fund 
2003. This includes among other measures (i) the assessment of accrued liabilities in the balance sheet, (ii) the 
tax or primary balance gap (on stochastic scenarios), (iii) net debt measures, (iv) fiscal generational unbalance 
measures, and (iv) the risk-weighted assessments of the government’s assets and liabilities. 
   6 
 
As a result of the observations above mentioned, the expected negative consequences of FI 
are: 
 
(i)  Implicit financial costs are larger than those actually collected in local public 
accounts. On the past, it has been observed (E. Garcia, 1999) that registered 
costs are lower than actual costs if providers would pay as due with no delays 
and provisions for bad debts would have been appropriately made. European 
Union legislation
7 establishes a maximum period for paying public 
administration creditors.  
We will take this benchmark (three months) in accounting for the difference between 
the theoretical financial cost related to paying creditors on time and the larger one due 
to existing delays. 
 
(ii)   Future sustainability of local service provision may be at risk as a consequence 
of the level of current expenditure passed. Capital assets must guarantee the 
continuity of the service over time. This is eroded by an unsound depreciation 
policy that does not correctly account for capital utilisation. By following this 
practice, we either a) apparently reduce costs in the short term (increasing FI 
and allowing additional spending programs) at the expense of risking financial 
bankruptcy in the future, or b) issue debt to guarantee capital to sustain the 
public services (reducing then financial margins for discretionary spending of 
future generations). Moreover, sustainability requires a minimum financial 
surplus for adapting public organisations to changing economic environments, 
and not just to hold capital for ‘standing still’
8.   
In order to estimate this factor we alternatively calculate, a) the potential revenue surplus 
that a municipality has for financing in case additional expenditure other than that required 
for fulfilling the economic balance. This may result from increasing taxes (if the ratio of the 
local authority, say, is below the sample average) and from the elasticity of local fiscal 
revenues from current taxed activity; and b) the revenue raising margins from issuing new 
debt, given the current levels and the existing limitations.  
Both factors try to measure the capability to finance the revenue gap for new investment, in 
addition to the accumulated municipal savings and central (and European) capital transfers. 
It approaches the difference between the estimated capital needs and the observed 
accumulated capital revenues plus the existing capacity to raise additional taxes and debt. 
 
-  The sample 
We confront our hypotheses on the effects of FI on financial management by using data 
from Catalan municipalities along the 1993-98 period, in a comparable data basis from the 
Auditing Commission.  
In order to homogenise our sample, given the disparity in population size and budget levels, 
we have taken data only for those municipalities with populations over 20,000. These are 
                                          
7  In Spain, through the 923/ 1985 Bill for the Public Administration Contracts. 
8  They may result from public regulation or from adopting what could defined as ‘sound economic and 
financial management practices’ in this field.  
   7 
considered local authorities with enough capability to run the required new information 
systems. Given data availability we selected finally 42 Catalan municipalities. 
 
-  The financial reporting system 
 
Poor financial and economic reporting has traditionally raised important problems in public 
management. For instance Hendriksen, in 1981 and Riahi, in 1992, refer to the cases of 
textile and railways industry in the X IX century, where large profits were paid to 
shareholders in an undue way. Benefits were defined as the difference between revenue 
flows and cash payments without considering capital depreciation. These were short-term 
profits for speculators and final bankruptcy for the remaining asset holders.   
In similar terms, long-term financial viability off public services depend on holding real 
assets. This requires the existence of a balanced equilibrium in order a) to keep physical 
capital in operation (Lüder, 1993), b) a systemic preventive procedures for quality 
assurance of the services (Pallot, 1994) and c) those repairs needed to keep the productive 
capacity of the investment goods up to the time of the reposition, in order to finance an 
equal or better equipment. If this is not the case, issuing debt or selling assets for financing 
the required equipments are the final effects of the former unsound accounting practices. As 
Anthony (1980) points out, non-profit organisations cannot identify the absence of profit 
targets with negligent accountancy in risking the sustainability of the activities of the 
organisation as a whole.  
 
In the Spanish context, since July 1990, rules for Local Administration Accountancy 
(ICAL) define a new Information System for budgetary and financial statements in order to 
build some economic indicators for a better management of public assets. These changes 
were supposed to be in place in 1992 but the rate of complete reporting is very low even 
today (see table 1). 
  
Accountancy practices in Spain still allow for the coexistence of the principles of accrual 
accounting (according to the day accrues the right to receive the revenues and duty are due 
to be paid) and the ‘cash’ criteria (the day they are actually paid). But once on of them is 
chosen, consistency is required. Despite the norm, this purpose is not yet largely 
guaranteed. 
 
In Catalonia, as in other parts of the Spanish state, local administrations had to implement 
the new Public Accountant Regime, set up by the several instructions
9 at the time of 
presenting the Annual Accounts and the Internal Audit. Its level of implementation is 
shown in table 1 for local authorities, according to size and year with regard to the actual 
budget settlement, financial surplus, balance sheet and ‘profits and losses’ account. 
 
Table 1 Description of the contents of the present financial reporting by the size of the 
local authorities 
  L. Authorities > 
20,000 citizens 
   Between 5,000 and 
20,000 citizens 
  L. Authorities < 
5,000 citizens 
                                          

























Number of Local 
Authorities 
42  42  43  45    103  103  114  114    797  798  787  787 
% of Local Authorities 
having fulfilled the 
information: 
                           
Closed budget in 
equilibrium 
98  98  100  100    91  95  93  98    54  68  76  82 
Carryover budget = Net 
recognised revenues  – 
Net recognised debts + 
cash 
95  100  100  100    89  90  91  96    52  67  76  82 
Providing the account of 
profits and losses  
83  88  100  100    82  91  88  94    52  67  76  81 
Exhibiting a Balance 
sheet  
88  90  98  100    81  91  88  94    52  67  76  82 
Source: Own elaboration from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya". 
 
Notice that the level of financial reporting diminishes with size (from 70% to 90%) and it 
increases along the years (almost 100% of Municipalities with 20,000 population and over 
in 1998).  
For this last group (Barcelona City Council was excluded in order not to distort our 
comparisons), Table 2 shows the degree of FI on the overall current budget revenues. 
Financial illusion is proxied by the difference between what is accounted for spending on 
capital reposition and what it should be according to some sounder common practices as 
those derived from private accountancy
10. FI potential gives the maximum amount of FI if 
the observed practices were applied to all public capital (this is, if nothing had been funded 
for equipment renewal). At any rate, the coefficient of variation as a measure of dispersion 
(the ratio in % between the average value and the standard deviation) shows very different 
situations. 
 
Table 2 The ‘financial illusion’ factor as a share of current revenues. Financial 
illusion is approached  here by the difference between what is actually accounted for 
spending on capital reposition and what it should be according to some sounder 
common practices (see footnote 10) 
FI (financial illusion)  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
%   16,3  17,3  14,6  14,6  11,9  11,8 
coefficient of variation  66  51  53  53  55  61 
% FI/FI potential  90%  93%  87%  82%  71%  69% 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya". 
Municipalities with more than 20.000 people (Barcelona not included). 
 
                                          
10 -See footnote 12.   9 
As it is shown in Table 2, the FI coefficient is always greater that 10%, diminishing over 
time, but with a large internal coefficient of variation. Moreover it can be seen that the ratio 
between actual and potential fiscal illusion decreases over time: from 90% up to around 
70% for the last years of the series. Table 3 offers some additional information on the 
number of Municipalities and the level of FI (less than 5%, between 5 and 15%, and more 
than 15%). 
 
Table 3 Number of Local Authorities (> 20.000 inhabitants) and level of financial 
illusion (% estimated level on current revenues). 
% total financial illusion divided by the 
budgeted current revenues  
1993  1995  1998 
Number of municipalities of  FI <5%   2  5  7 
Number of municipalities between 5 and 
15% of  FI  
20  17  21 
Number of municipalities with % of FI 
>15% 
20  20  14 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya". 
 
 
III.- TESTING AND RESULTS 
 
The effect of under-reporting financial costs in creating financial illusion is shown in Table 
4. Figures reflect the average delay in payments under the hypothesis of linearity in 
expenditure compelling. Terms are well above the benchmarked three months for the 1993-
95 period and two months thereafter11, although they are lowering over time. However 
internal variation on the average delay for the outstanding credits among Local Authorities 
is rather stable or increasing. 
 
Table 4 Average delay for the outstanding credits (days). 
  1993  1995  1998 
Municipalities(*)  239,3  219,7  176,3 
Variation coefficient   58,2  57,8  67,2 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya" data. 
(*) Amongst those larger than 20.000. 
 
The estimated financial costs of these delays, weighted by the different term constrain of 
wages and other type of payments are estimated in Table 5. The financial cost of this form 
of short-term debt is therefore estimated in 45 days for the 1993-95 period and 30 days 
thereafter. Most of this cost is not just a ‘social opportunity cost’ but an extra financial cost 
paid by the administration, once we plausibly assume that there exists an implicit surcharge 
from providers on the prices charged for those public supplies with delayed payment. 
 
                                          
11  The 923/1965 Bill for the State Contracts, section 47, and the13/1995 Bill for the Contracts of the Public 
Administration, section 100.   10 
Table 5 Estimated financial cost due to credit outstanding (in euros per capita). 
  1993  1995  1998 
Local authorities (*)  16.3  16.8  7.3 
Variation coefficient (%)  89.1  91.3  91.1 
Interest rate considered
12  9%  9%  4% 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya". 
(*) Amongst those larger than 20,000. 
 
 
Finally, table 6 explores tentatively the correlation between financial illusion, payment 
delays and cash surplus in order to finance additional expenditure. The signs are the 
expected ones in all the cases but the statistical significance is low. 
 
Table 6 Linear regression statistics (#). 




Constant  75.8  114.7 
t ratio  (6.3)  (16.2) 
  % Financial illusion divided by budgeted current revenues  9.5  5.3 
t ratio  (13.1)  (11.6) 
Estimated % Carryover budget divided by budgeted current 
revenues (year n-1) 
-  -2.9 
t ratio  -  (-25) 
Standard error with estimation  97.8  50.1 
Determination coefficient   0.4  0.84 
F  -  540.4 
Degrees of freedom  256  212 
(#) Individual values for each observation within periods. 1993 data have some reliability 
problems we cannot deal with and the exercise is then repeated for the period 1994-98. 
 Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya" data. 
 
A second large area of hypothesis testing refers to the way that financial illusion 
expenditure affects the capability to produce public services. This may be due to unsound 
accounting practices related to depreciation and reserves, as commented. 
 
Table 7 describes some explanatory variables for the variation in the observed equity 






                                          
12 The basic interest rate of Bank of Spain until 1996. Since 1997. MIBOR 1 year.   11 
Table 7 Explanatory variables for the variation in equity as a % of current revenues 
from the ‘profit and losses’ account (*). 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
% FI /CR  14.5  12.4  12.6  10.4  10.4 
           
Estimated variation in 
equity (or net losses) on 
CR (%) 
13.9  13.6  4.6  23.6  18.0 
           
% EOR  2.1  1.8  -0.8  5.2  5.1 
% ECG  3.1  2.2  4.1  2.0  5.3 
EOR + ECG   5.2  4.0  3.3  7.2  10.4 
           
% EONPL    8.7  9.6  1.3  16.4  7.6 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya". 
FI: Financial illusion, CR: Current revenues from ‘profit and losses’ account. EOR: 
Estimated operating result, ECG: Estimated capital grants. EONPL: Estimated other net 
losses. 
(*) Average of 42 local authorities. 
 
Our calculations show that the weight of the estimated FI on current revenues diminish over 
the period at the same time that estimated losses with adequate accountancy on total 
operating result and capital grants are increasing in the last three years. 
 
As commented, the maintenance capability of a particular model for service provision 
depends on the increase in the equity value (net worth) of the organisation. This depends on 
the economic results from the activity and on the availability of external capital grants. This 
capability also has to do not only with the efficiency of the model providing services (see 
Pina & Torres, 2002) but with existing safeguards for capital equipments and some other 
dynamic social constrains (such as non-discriminatory a ccess to services, equality of 
opportunities, due procedures, etc.) 
 
In a previous paper, Garcia, 1998
13, showed that during the 1992-95 period for local 
authorities below 5,000 inhabitants, if we adopted for the public equipments similar criteria 
on reposition as for private ones, the level of under-funding varied from 40% to 90%. The 
absence of an appropriate depreciation policy links to the discussion on how capital grants 
should be accounted in local public sector balance sheets. Table 8 offers a range of possible 
interpretations on how to consider capital grants. They affect the net worth of an 
organisation over time and then the inter-temporal and intergenerational effects (Henke, 




                                          
13 Garcia Alegre, E. "La inversió en reposició dels Ajuntaments de Catalunya majors de 5.000 habitants". 
1992-1995. Mimeo. 1998   12 
Table 8 Different approaches in computing capital grants (CG). 
CG  CG as…  Explanation  Use of capital grant 
100 % 
? equity  
CG are considered a sort 
of intergenerational 
contribution 
The CG only finance the growth of the 
equipment or its upgrading  
< 100 % 
? equity 




The CG are partially applied to the renewal of 







The CG are fully 
considered as operating 
revenue of the period 
The CG only finance the renewal of existing 
equipment 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
A first option consists of valuing the capital grants as the ownership of all generations in 
society. In this sense, reposition costs should be self-financed and those grants should be 
devoted to improve the quality of the services. The second alternative considers that since 
grants are tax financed at some general level (say at the State or at the European Union 
level) they are also partly paid by local taxpayers. Therefore, full self-finance of reposition 
costs is not grounded and we need to blend financially both (new and existing) capital 
components. Thirdly, it may also be considered that there is a correspondence between 
what taxpayers finance locally and the share they receive from the overall central grants. 
This would require that the full amount of the grant to be considered as current revenue for 
the purpose of maintaining the net assets of the present administration.  
In practice, financial liabilities and capital grants commonly finance the equipment 
renewal. If the financial resources related to the depreciation charges are devoted to the 
reduction of the existing financial liabilities, the intergenerational equilibrium is better 
preserved. In this sense, accumulated funds could be used to lower the need for financing 
capital by issuing net debt and the existing margin can be then used for financing the 
reposition investment whenever required.  
 
In Table 9 we explore whether the capacity for delivering public services at an appropriate 
quality level holds in our sample over time. Under the first and third criteria for valuing 
capital grants we detect important differences, with an increasing dap along the years: The 
ratio between the row 1 and 3 changes from less that 10% up to 25% (with a 40% change 
over the 1994-98 period). The conclusion is sensitive on whether we accumulate capital 
grants and reduce them from existing assets. 
 
Table 9 Share of capital grants in total equity composition (euros per capita). 
Local authorities (*)  1994  1995  1996  1997 1998 Variation 
1998-1994 
 Equity without adjustment per capita 
(1) 
418  460  480  533  625  207   
Accumulated Capital Gains (ACG) per 
capita (2) 
22  45  73  103  145  123   13 
 Equity minusACG   per capita (3)  396  415  407  430  480  84 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya". ACG: Accumulated 
capital grant. 
(*) Average population of local authorities above 20,000 people (Barcelona excluded). 
 
Finally, economic sustainability is estimated by (i) an indicator on the margins each local 
administration have, in order to react against changes impelling expenditure increases, by 
adjusting their local tax levels to the average of similar authorities (Table 10), and (ii) 
issuing debt in order to invest in reposition of equipment, obsolete assets, large repairs and 
new investments. This margin is defined as the difference between existing debts and the 
maximum debt allowed by law. Today the stated rule requires a positive economic result 
for the current final budget settlement and that the existing total debt does not exceed 110% 
of all the current revenues effectively collected in the last budgetary exercise




Table 10 Estimated average level of the ‘sustainability margin’ (SM) as a share of the 
current revenues. 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Average   5.3  4.9  3.4  9.9  11.8 
coefficient. of variation  7.6  9.8  8.3  12.0  10.9 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya". 
 
 
For the first indicator (table 10) we observe a rather low margin for tax increases for those 
below average levels, increasing over time, but with a constant (high) coefficient of variation. 
The regression in Table 11 shows the expected negative signs between the ‘financial illusion’ 
index and the sustainability indicator, despite the low statistical significance. Simple 
correlation is particularly high for the three first years of the sample (table 11). 
  
Table  11 Estimated regression between the sustainability margin ( SM) and the 
financial illusion (FI) index: Two periods: 1994-96 and 1996-98. 
  SM96  SM98 
Constant  13.7  17.3 
t ratio  6.0  4.6 
Coefficient of FI9496 and 
FI9698 
-0.9  -0.5 
t ratio  -5.0  -1.6 
R
2  0.39  0.36 
Degrees of freedom  40  40 
                                          
14 The 39/1988 Bill, section 54.1 and 54.2 was modified by the 50/1998 Bill section 59. The new benchmark on issuing local public debt 
is more accurate than the old one.  This was stated as an overall limitation based on the rule that the financial costs of the existing debt 
could not exceed 25% of the current local  revenues without distinguishing between the nature of these revenues and the prevailing rate 
of interest. At present, The Budget Stability Bill has come to further restrict the former situation.   14 
Simple correlation coefficient  -0.62  -0.25 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya" data. 
FI9496 and FI9698 = Average financial illusion between 1994 and 1996, and between 1996 
and 1998.  




In Table 12 we collect the % of total debts on current revenues and in Table 13 we regress 
the index for FI and the margins for issuing additional debt 
 
Table 12 Estimated percentage of total debts on current revenues. 
  1993  1995  1998 
Average   115  113  115 
Variation coefficient (%).  57  58  62 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya" data. 
 
 
Table 13 The estimated regression of the financial illusion index (FI) on the debt 
margin (DM). 
  DM96  DM98 
Constant  40.3  51.0 
t ratio  3.2  3.4 
Coefficient of FI9496 and 
FI9698 
-4.5  -5.3 
t ratio  -4.5  -4.1 
R2  0.34  0.29 
Degrees of freedom  40  40 
Correlation coefficient  -0.58  -0.54 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya" data. 
FI9496 or FI9698 = Average financial illusion between 1994 and 1996, and between 1996 
and 1998 
DM = Debt margin as a percentage of the current revenues for the corresponding year. 
 
In contrast to table 11, in table 13 we observe, rather surprisingly, that for the second 
indicator (potential debt margins), it is observed a zero capability for issuing net debt along 
all the period if new rules (expected to be implemented in 1999) were applied. This should 
be an important cause of concern. The correlation again is unambiguously negative 
between this result and an important number of local authorities ‘living’ in larger financial 
illusion contexts as we have hypothesized in this paper. 
 
Finally, we assumed that financial i llusion was in the manager advantage. To test this 
requires more data we do not have (managerial turnover, financial slack, etc.). With our 
data, preliminary results are in table 14. It shows that FI makes for an irrelevant carryover   15 
budget or economic net profit (loss), either positive or negative at convenience. In this case, 
social prestige and higher expenditure levels related to what ‘it looks like’ a positive result 
and it may allow for a ‘free’ disposal of the accumulated budget surplus, certainly increases 
with FI, particularly for the 1994-96 period, as it has been argued in the paper. 
 
Table 14 Managerial effects from financial illusion (FI). 
Number of Local 
Authorities by 
importance of FI (+/-) 
Average FI 1994-96 
% of cases benefiting from FI  
Average FI of 1996-98 
% of cases benefiting from 
FI 












10  70%  70%  50%  70% 
20  55%  65%  50%  70% 
30  50%  60%  53%  63% 
Source: Own calculations from "Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya". 






We conclude from our analysis that financial illusion shows a clear positive relationship 
with total local expenditure. Mechanisms for FI creation have to do with, among other 
factors, with delays in paying to suppliers (with then higher future financial costs per unit 
of service), no adequate provision for bad debts and with the lack of appropriate capital 
funding either for reposition or for financing new investment. For this latter feature, it is 
extremely important to check on how capital grants are accounted in public financial 
statements. 
No incentives for public managers seem to exist for changing the situation and therefore 
improving financial and economic reporting in Public Administration. On the contrary, it 
may be the case that incentives go in the other direction: hiding information and avoiding a 
more accurate reporting system and citizens’ accountability make overall for an easier life 
for politicians and public managers, at least in the short term.  
 
On the whole the results confirm that there is a statistical relationship between the financial 
illusion index (as constructed in the paper) and expenditure overruns as measured by the 
delayed payment period for suppliers, as well as by the deficit in local capital depreciation. 
For this, it proves to be very relevant the way in which capital grants are accounted in 
public balances. As a result of the existing practices, for most of the Municipalities in our 
sample, funds for guaranteeing continuity and sustainability of public services provision are 
indeed at risk. For most of the analysed cases we find that no financial margins exist for re-
balancing the situation either by issuing net debtsor by raising taxes in order to guarantee 
the sustainability of local services provision, and then re-instaure a sounder capital finance 
   16 
Since it is observed that public managers and politicians benefit from financial illusion, we 
conclude that new local public regulation may not be enough to change the current state of 
affairs and that better incentives should be provided with regard to the way in which public 





Antony, R.N. (1980).  Making sese of non-business accounting. Harvard Business 
Review, vol 58 nº 3, pp.83-93. 
 
Caplan E.H. (1971) ‘Management accounting and behavioural science’ Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley Publish. 
 
Cooper R. and R. Kaplan (1988) ‘How cost accounting systematically distorst product 
costs. Management Accounting, april pp. 20-27. 
 
Chenhall R.H. and Morris D. (1986) ‘The impact of structure, environment and 
interdependence on the perceived usefulness of management accountuing systems’ 
The Accounting Review vol LXI, 1 January pps. 16-35 
Fuertes I. and Vela Bargues, J.M. (2000).  ‘La contabilidad de la administración local 
en Europa: Heterogeneidad y armonización’. Revista española  de financiación y 
contabilidad, vol. XXIX, núm.105, pp. 657-686. 
 
Garcia, Eugeni (1999)  Los efectos de la ilusión financiera en la gestión económico-
financiera de las A.A. P.P.  Col·lecció de tesis doctorals microfitxades. Núm 3714. 
Universitat de Barcelona. 
 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)  (1989).  ‘Measurement focus 
and basis of  Accounting-Governmental Fund Operating Statements’. Statement nº11. 
 
Hendriksen, Eldon S. (1981).  Teoría de la contabilidad. Unión Tipográfica Editorial. 
 
Henke, E.O. (1987).  ‘Governmental Financial Statements-Generational Equity 
Reporting’. The Government Accountants Journal, summer, pp.18-22. 
 
López Casasnovas, G. (1995).  Instrumentos al servicio de la eficiencia en la gestión 
pública. V Congreso Nacional de Economía. Las Palmas. 
   17 
López Casasnovas, G. et al. (2003).  Los nuevos instrumentos de la gestión pública. 
Colección Estudios Económicos no 31. La Caixa;  301 pages. 
 
Lüder, Klaus. (1993).  Una comparació internacional de les pràctiques de comptabilitat 
del sector públic.Actius fixes, depreciació i manteniment. Ponencia presentada en las 
jornadas “Tendencias y evolución de la Administración pública: A la búsqueda de 
una major eficacia. Barcelona 10-12 de febrero. Sindicatura de Comptes de 
Catalunya. 
 
Lüder, Klaus. (1995).  Governmental capital asset accounting. A survey Study. The 
Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE). Published by: The chartered 
institute of public finance and accountancy (CIPFA). London. 
 
Mayston D (1992) Capital Accounting, user needs and the foundations of a conceptual 
framework for public sector financial reporting’  Financial Accountability and 
Management, 8(4) Winter pps 22- 240. 
 
Miller G. J, and T.M. Moe (1983)  Bureaucrats, legislators and the Size of the 
Government, American Political Science Review, 77: 297-322. 
 
Miller G. J. (1977), Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the uUnit Square, Public 
Choice, 29; 37-54. 
Niskanen, W. (1971).  Bureaucracy and representative government, Aldine-Atherton, 
Chicago. 
 
Niskanen, W. (1975).  ‘Bureaucrats and politicians’, Journal of Law and Economics, 
18, pp. 617-643. 
 
Oates, W.E. (1988) ‘On the nature and measurement of fiscal illusion; A Survey, pp 
65-82 in G. Brennan et al (eds.)  Taxation and Fiscal Federalism. Australian Univ. 
Press. 
 
Pallot, J. (1994) “Accounting for infraestructure assets: Theory and Practice in New 
Zealand”.  Paper prepared for the CIGAR worshop. IVIE. Valencia. 1994. 
 
Pallot, June (1996).  ‘Innovations in national government accounting and budgeting in 
New Zealand’. Research in Governmental Non-profit Accounting, vol. 9, pp. 323-348. 
   18 
 Pina, V & L. Torres (2002) ‘Propiedad y organización en la prestación de servicios 
públicos municipales: Análisis y evidencias empíricas comparadas’  Cuadernos 
Económicos, no 16 Fac de C. Económicas dela Univ. de Zaragoza. 
 
Prior T.E. (1990) ‘Designing your new cost system is simple but not easy’ Journal of 
Cost management pp 43-47 
 
Puviani, A. (1903). Teoría della Illusione finanziaria. Ed. Remo Sandron. Palermo. 
 
Riahi Belkaoui, Ahmed, (1992).  Accounting Theory. Academic Press.  University of 
Illinois at Chicago. 
 
Servei d’Informació Econòmica Municipal. SIEM (1995-1997).  Memoria. Diputación 
de Barcelona. 
 
Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya (1993-1998).  Compte general de les 
corporacions locals. Barcelona. 
 
Vela, J.M. (1992).  Conceptos y Principios de Contabilidad Pública. ICAC. MEH. 
 